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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the fact that economic theory predicts that foreign investment is clearly beneficial for 
countries, foreign participation in privatizations around the world tends to be controversial and 
quite unpopular in the public domain. Anti-globalization proponents claim that foreign 
participation is, perhaps, responsible for both employment losses and a subsequent lack of hiring 
by firms in emerging markets. Furthermore, privatization is often used as a classic example of 
what is wrong with globalization (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003; Feffer, 2005).  
This belief is particularly persistent in developing countries and has its roots in the old 
center-periphery view of developed and developing countries. In this view, the developing 
periphery countries act as satellites of the developed center countries by providing raw materials 
for processing and manufacturing without being able to develop their own domestic industries. 
They thus end up being exploited and tied to industrial countries either directly or indirectly 
(Prebisch, 1980; Myrdal, 1989). A somewhat related—although less-structured—view has 
emerged, propounded mainly by the so-called anti-globalization groups.  This view, which is 
based on political economy considerations, claims that prospective foreign and domestic buyers 
do not compete on a level playing field since the former frequently receive substantial implicit or 
explicit political support from foreign governments with the aim of influencing and skewing 
domestic government policies towards their interests, either as a result of outright corruption, or 
simply because of the political economy implications in a developing country of having to deal 
with an industrial country (Henwood, 1996; Feffer, 2005). The interaction between developing 
and developed countries is likened to a potential David and Goliath predicament, a situation in 
which smaller, less powerful countries find it particularly difficult to deal with bigger countries 
and tend to acquiesce to the pressures of countries on which they depend economically.  
Very broadly speaking, there are two variants to this argument, one at the firm level and  
the other at the country level. The argument at the firm level maintains that because foreign firms 
tend to be economically more powerful than domestic firms, they may be able to pick and choose 
from among the available state-owned enterprises for sale. Furthermore, several anti-
globalization critics argue that smaller domestic firms may not want to upset any future working 
relationship with bigger international firms since both are typically in the same economic sector, 
a fact that places the domestic firm at disadvantage in the potential bidding. The second 
argument has to do with the political pressure exerted by foreign government lobbies (Henwood,   5
1996; Feffer, 2005). This is not uncommon in the case of firms from industrial countries that 
invest in emerging market economies. Foreign legislators, foreign ministers and even foreign 
heads or ex-heads of state may exert pressure on domestic governments in order to receive 
information on or support actions by particular firms. Prospective foreign buyers may end up 
obtaining inside information or may simply benefit from outright corruption, with the result that 
they bid on the firms in best economic shape, with the highest potential or with more favorable 
labor conditions (Feffer, 2005).   
There is little empirical evidence on the link between foreign ownership of privatized 
firms and post-privatization labor outcomes,
2 despite the fact that it has been a recurring theme in 
both international economics and development economics, albeit mainly at a macroeconomic 
level. This paper takes advantage of recently collected data by Chong and López-de-Silanes 
(2003), which helps provide empirical evidence to assess whether some of the key arguments 
made by anti-globalization critics have any bearing with the facts. In particular, it explores the 
post-privatization hiring patterns of privatized firms as well as the somewhat more limited 
measures of post-privatization firing and wages. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data used. The third section describes the findings of the paper. The last section 
summarizes and concludes.  
2. Data 
Our sample is based on data first collected by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003). These data 
were collected from a list compiled by the authors of about 1500 privatizations around the world 
occurring between 1982 and 2000. The two main sources for this list are the World Bank 
Privatization database and Privatisation International, which together provide arguably the 
largest source of privatization transactions in the world. From this original list, Chong and 
López-de-Silanes (2003) selected a random sample of 400 firms to whom they sent a detailed 
questionnaire. Of the 400 cases targeted, the authors were able to obtain data for 308 
                                                           
2 Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) analyze the relationships between the factors leading to retrenchment and the scope 
and nature of the retrenchment. Although their quantitative information is limited, they focus on the factors leading a 
significant fraction of programs to rehire workers separated from the public sector, thereby defeating the objectives 
of the program. Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2003) test the wisdom of retrenchment programs and their effect on 
re-hiring policies by private owners after privatization. They show that adverse selection plagues retrenchment 
programs carried out by governments before privatization since various types of downsizing policies lead to a higher 
frequency of re-hiring of the same workers by the new private owners.    6
privatizations from 84 countries, accounting for 97.21 percent of total privatization sales during 
the relevant period.
3  
The questionnaire was addressed to each firm’s CEO with a recommendation to direct it 
to the firm’s chief financial officer and the director of human resources. In order to ensure the 
quality of the data, the authors employed four additional sources. First, they took advantage of 
the fact that in several developing countries, many privatizations were performed as part of 
structural adjustments or other lending programs supported by the World Bank. They were able 
to access a wide range of the World Bank’s internal documents to verify and in some instances, 
complement the information collected in the survey. In particular, they made extensive use of the 
World Bank’s electronic Intranet system called ImageBank, which allows full access to such 
documents. Second, they also made broad use of NEXIS to examine a number of national and 
international publications. Third, whenever possible, the authors interviewed officials from 
international organizations who were directly associated with the privatization programs in 
different countries. Finally, when necessary, they contacted the privatization offices or 
corresponding ministries of each country to request specific pre-privatization information that 
was missing.  
Table 1 provides the definitions and sources of all the variables used in this paper. 
Whereas Chong and López-de-Silanes’ data include pre-privatization firm characteristics such as 
sales, the presence of unions and the privatization price, we focus on post-privatization outcomes 
such as foreign ownership and related labor outcomes,  firm rehiring and new hiring and basic 
characteristics of such post-privatization employment. In this case, the available observations 
vary depending on the specific variable considered. For instance, while the total number of 
observations for rehires after privatization is 225, there are only 61 observations as to whether 
such rehires are white collar or not. Although some variables may be interpreted in a more 
tentative manner than others because of this issue, the consistency of our findings is quite 
                                                           
3 The countries included are Benin, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Senegal, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Madagascar, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, United States, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Mexico, Saint 
Vincent, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Barbados, Bahrain, China India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Kuwait, Lao, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Yemen, Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.   7
remarkable and provides some assurances on the very little evidence  found in the literature 
(Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999). Table 2 provides summary statistics. 
 
3. Findings 
Table 3 provides a test of means between foreign participation/no foreign participation and post-
privatization labor outcomes. We divide the sample of firms into two groups according to 
whether the variable of interest equals 1, in which case it is a dummy variable. Similarly, when 
the variable of interest is a continuous variable, we divide the sample in two groups depending 
on whether the mean of the variable of interest is above or below the sample average. We do find 
statistically significant differences in some post-privatization labor outcomes that appear to be 
linked to foreign participation in privatized firms. In particular, we find that in firms where 
foreign ownership was allowed, the proportion of workers that were rehired after privatization 
was lower than in those privatized firms where foreign ownership was not allowed. We obtain 
analogous findings in the case of temporary rehires and permanent rehires as well as weakly 
statistical significance in the case of white-collar rehires. These results are consistent with the 
view that foreign prospective buyers have an informational advantage or, as described above, 
may be able to exert compromises from domestic governments. Still, as revealing as these results 
may be, they are at most suggestive of a relevant link between foreign participation and labor 
outcomes. Since there are no additional controls included in these tests, they can hardly be 
construed as definitive evidence.  
Table 4 presents the results of the basic heteroscedasticity-corrected probit regressions in 
which the dependent variables are post-privatization labor outcomes. We find that foreign 
participation in the privatization of state-owned enterprises is linked to a lower probability of 
rehiring previously fired workers. This is shown in the first column in Table 4. When the 
privatization process allows the participation of foreign firms, the probability of the firms 
rehiring previously fired workers decreases drastically; the coefficient of this variable is 0.46 and 
is statistically significant at 5 percent. This result is quite revealing since rehires are an indication 
of the quality of the retrenchment process before privatization and the results suggest adverse 
selection in the labor restructuring process of the firm. However, there is no economically 
sensible reason why a worker who was fired, possibly as part of the restructuring process before   8
privatization, should be rehired after privatization unless he/she was really needed for the 
adequate functioning of the firm (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999; Chong and López-de-Silanes, 
2003).
4 This finding appears to suggest that foreign firms benefited from high-level political 
pressure, or corrupt officials allowed them to purchase the most efficient state-owned enterprises, 
or they had better information on the quality of the restructuring of the state-owned enterprises 
than did the domestic firms before privatization, or simply that foreign firms were more diligent 
when scouting purchase possibilities.  
As Column 1 also shows, foreign participation from firms in industrial countries is not 
linked to a different probability of rehiring workers. This somewhat weakens the claims related 
to political pressure and, to some extent, corruption. In this context, the revised center-periphery 
hypothesis put forward by anti-globalization proponents does not appear to be supported by the 
evidence.
5 Similarly, since all prospective purchasers are provided with the same information, 
which is typically put together by reputed investment banks and advisors, it appears unlikely that 
foreign firms may have received undue informational advantages in the bidding process. If 
anything, one may claim that it is more reasonable to expect that domestic firms, not foreign 
ones, would have easier access to inside information. It may simply be the case that, on average, 
and given their expertise and prior experience, foreign firms may be better able to more 
accurately assess the potential performance and profitability of a state-owned enterprise for sale. 
Table 4 shows that whereas there is also a significant link between foreign participation and 
other categories of rehires, such as white collar and permanent rehires, there is no statistical link 
between foreign participation and the wages of rehired workers, as shown in Column 2. This 
gives further credence to the idea that foreign firms somehow manage to purchase state-owned 
enterprises that were better restructured before privatization. Furthermore, according to the 
evidence presented in Table 4, allowing foreign ownership of privatized firms does not increase 
the probability that new workers will be hired after privatization, since the corresponding 
coefficients of the probit regressions are statistically insignificant regardless of the type of new 
hiring considered, whether permanent new hires or white collar new hires. These results are 
shown in Columns 5 to 7. Finally, foreign participation does have a statistical bearing on the 
probability of temporary rehires, but has no link with post-privatization firing, as shown in 
                                                           
4 Please see Table 1 for the precise definition of rehires. 
5 Also, when including an interactive variable between corruption and foreign ownership, we obtain negative 
coefficients that are, however, statistically insignificant.   9
Columns 8 and 9. In fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, we find a negative link with 
temporary hires. These results are not consistent with the anti-globalization argument that 
foreign firms tend to “exploit” workers. 
Table 5 repeats the same exercise as above, but instead of using a foreign participation 
measure, it uses a variable that captures foreign control.
6 The results are similar to those in Table 
4 in that rehires are negatively linked with foreign control, wages yield no statistical link, 
different categories for new hires yield no statistical link, temporary hires yield a positive and 
statistical significant link and interactive dummies between industrial countries and control yield 
no statistical significance with respect to foreign control. The only difference is that the sub-
categories of rehires (white collar and permanent) are not statistically significant in this case, 
although this may be due to lack of power in the regressions, as explained in footnote 6. 
A potential problem with these empirical results is that they do not take into account 
potential endogeneity issues. While the dependent variable always captures post-privatization 
labor outcomes, it may be the case that foreign firms have specific expectations about state-
owned enterprise restructuring before privatization, which may have been fed by the fact that not 
all firm restructuring in one country is done at the same moment. Governments try to restructure 
state-owned enterprises before the sale in order to raise the privatization price, but the negative 
sign may simply reflect the fact that the firms in the worst shape are in need of restructuring. For 
instance, if the unobservable characteristics of a firm are positively correlated with the presence 
of strong unions, the government may be particularly interested in dismantling such unions. 
Following López-de-Silanes (1997), we apply a two-step instrumental variables approach and 
estimate a non-linear reduced-form equation that describes the probability that firm restructuring 
will be implemented.
7 As required by this procedure, none of these variables is statistically 
                                                           
6 While legislation as to what percentage of ownership leads to firm control varies among countries, we impose a 
high threshold by assuming that such control is reached at 50.1 percent of ownership, which in all cases is the 
highest minimum level that allows control. By doing this, we lose about 20 percent of observations and thus, degrees 
of freedom, in the following categories: white collar and permanent rehires and white collar and permanent new 
hires. We also repeat the exercise in Tables 4 and 5, but we use percentage of foreign ownership. The findings are 
identical to those presented in Table 5 but are not reported.  
7 The instruments used are firm-level and macroeconomic-level determinants. Among the first, we use (i) a dummy 
variable to reflect whether a leading agent bank organized privatization, (ii) the involvement of the Ministry of 
Finance or Economy before privatization and (iii) whether the country was undertaking a structural reform during 
the privatization of the firm. The macroeconomic variables are: (iv) the average fiscal deficit in the three years prior 
to privatization, (v) the legal origin of the country and (vi) the average degree of openness in the three years prior to 
privatization. (i), (ii), and (iii) are from Chong and López-de-Silanes (2003); (iv), (v) and (vi) are from the World 
Bank (2004).   10
significant when included in the price equation. Also the F-statistic for the excluded instruments 
is statistically significant at 1 percent in all cases. Regardless of the use of a broad combination 
of possible instruments, the findings do not change the original probit estimates in Table 4 or 




Whereas many empirical studies show that firms shed labor before and during privatization as 
part of radical restructuring processes, little is known about what happens with labor after 
privatization. According to anti-globalization critics, labor outcomes will be negative when 
foreign firms are allowed participation in the privatized firms. We use cross-country new data to 
show that post-privatization labor outcomes are essentially the same regardless of whether purely 
domestic or foreign firms own the companies. Whereas the evidence presented here points to the 
fact that foreign purchasers of state-owned enterprises manage to acquire firms that were better 
restructured before privatization, it cannot be said that their participation is linked to negative 
labor outcomes. 
                                                           
8 Given space restrictions, these findings are not reported but they are available upon request.   11
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Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Sales  This variable represents the net real value of the three-year average of firm sales 
before privatization, denominated in U.S dollars, as of December 2000.  
Economic  Sector  Set of dummy variables for the corresponding sectors: metallic minerals, 
nonmetallic minerals, beverages, textiles, clothing and leather, wood, hotels and 
restaurants, transportation; communications and recreation. The variable equals to 
1 if state-owned enterprise belongs to the sector and equals 0 otherwise.  
Net total liabilities  This variable equals 1 if total short plus long term debt is greater than net total 
assets (debt overhang) up to three years prior to privatization. It equals 0 
otherwise.  
Foreign participation  This variable equals 1 if bidding of foreign firms was allowed in the privatization 
of the state-owned enterprise. It equals 0 otherwise.  
Foreign control  This variable equals 1 if foreign ownership is high enough to allow control of the 
privatized firm. It equals 0 otherwise.  
Share  sold  This variable reflects the percentage of the shares sold of the state-owned 
enterprise in the privatization.  
Unions  This variable equals 1 if the state-owned enterprise had a union up to three years 
prior to privatization. It equals 0 otherwise. 
Strikes  This variable equals 1 if the firm faced any protest, picketing, or strikes up to 
three years prior to privatization. It equals 0 otherwise.  
Rehires  This variable equals 1 if the privatized firm rehired previously fired workers up to 
18 months after privatization net of any post-privatization fires. It equals 0 
otherwise. “Workers previously fired” include those fired up to three years prior 
to privatization.  








Permanent new hires 
 








This variable equals 1 if the rehired worker is white collar. It equals 0 otherwise.  
This variable equals 1 if rehired worker has been hired using a permanent 
contract. It equals 0 otherwise.  
This variable equals 1 if the privatized firm hired new workers up to 18 months 
after privatization, net of any post-privatization fires. It equals 0 otherwise. This 
variable does not include rehires, but only post-privatization workers who did not 
work with the firm prior to privatization.  
This variable equals 1 if the new worker was hired through a permanent contract. 
It equals 0 otherwise. 
This variable equals 1 if the new worker is white collar. It equals 0 otherwise.  
This variable equals 1 if the rehired worker is white collar. It equals 0 otherwise. 
This variable equals 1 if the wages of the rehired worker are higher than the 
worker’s wages were when fired. It equals 0 otherwise. 
This variable equals o1 if the firm fired workers up to 12 months after 
privatization. It equals 0 otherwise. 
Gross domestic product  Logarithm  of the average gross domestic product for the three years prior to 
privatization of the country from which the state-owned enterprise belongs. Atlas 
method, expressed in current U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2001). 
Economic Growth 
 
Average rate of growth for the three years prior privatization of the country from 
which the state-owned enterprise belongs. Source: World Bank (2001). 
Continental  Dummies  Set of five dummy identifying variables, which each equal 1 if a particular 
country corresponds to (i) Latin America, (ii) Asia, (iii) Africa and the Middle 
East, (iv) Developed Countries, (v) and Transition Economies. It equals 0 
otherwise.   13
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Sales 308  1.415  3.167  0.001  21.991 
Mining 308  0.143  0.350  0.000  1.000 
Manufacturing 308  0.231  0.422  0.000  1.000 
Services 308  0.558  0.497  0.000  1.000 
Foreign participation  308  0.682  0.467  0.000  1.000 
Share sold  308  0.509  0.282  0.010  1.000 
Unions 308  0.844  0.363  0.000  1.000 
Strikes 308  0.474  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Rehires 225  0.444  0.498  0.000  1.000 
Wages rehires  113  0.654  0.477  0.000  1.000 
White collar rehires  42  0.428  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Permanent rehires  109  0.349  0.478  0.000  1.000 
New hires  99  0.484  0.502  0.000  1.000 
Permanent new hires  86  0.593  0.478  0.000  1.000 
White collar new hires  61  0.508  0.504  0.000  1.000 
Temporary hires  292  0.240  0.428  0.000  1.000 
Fires 104  0.567  0.497  0.000  1.000 
Gross domestic product  308  25.40  1.851  19.448  28.856 
Economic growth  308  3.028  3.811  -11.144  21.320 
Latin America  308  0.328  0.470  0.000  1.000 
Asia 308  0.078  0.268  0.000  1.000 
Africa and middle east  308  0.208  0.406  0.000  1.000 
Developed Countries  308  0.250  0.434  0.000  1.000 
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Table 3. Tests of Means and Medians 
 
  SOEs where foreign 
participation was 
allowed             (a)
SOEs where foreign 
participation was not 






Rehires 0.3143 0.4146 -0.1003  1.625
c 
Wages rehires  0.5826 0.5955 -0.0129  1.264
 
White collar rehires  0.2698 0.5788 -0.3091  3.012
a 
Permanent rehires  0.2822 0.4821 -0.1999  2.013
b 
New hires  0.3571 0.3780 -0.0209  0.332
Permanent new hires  0.3046 0.3355 -0.0309  1.091
White collar new hires  0.2808 0.3682 -0.0874  0.454
Temporary hires  0.2095 0.3171 -0.1075  1.940
b 
Fires 0.6122 0.5965 0.0157  0.112
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Table 4. Post-Privatization Labor Outcomes and Foreign Participation 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
 








Temporary hires Fires 
Foreign Participation  -0.4641
** 0.1074 -1.756
** -0.2550 -0.0985  -0.1049 0.5150 -1.4915
** 0.2156
     (0.251)   (0.381) (0.876) (0.396) (0.490)  (0.439) (0.629) (0.243) (0.417)
Foreign Participation*Industrial 0.0451 0.1388 1.512 -0.4482 -0.4961  -7.2565 0.5634 -0.2380 -.04697
 (0.450) (0.642) (0.939) (0.627) (0.826)  (6.686) (1.140) (0.446) (0.825)
Unions 0.6554
** 0.3507 0.2790 -0.0153 0.4921   0.4631 0.7117 -0.2354 -0.4104
 (0.308) (0.546) (0.974) (0.634) (0.498)  (0.318) (0.860) (0.291) (0.516)
Strikes 0.2288 0.0691 0.5891 0.3710 -0.2433  0.3087 0.2711 0.6530 -0.020
 (0.194) (0.296) (0.716) (0.323) (0.355)  (0.442) (0.436) (0.199) (0.331)




* (0.005) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
Sales 0.0032 -0.0246 -0.0379 -0.4529 -0.0265  0.0818 0.0552 -0.0197 -0.1119* 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.043)  (0.029) (0.055) (0.019) (0.076)
Gross Domestic Product  0.1850 0.1586**  0.0434 0.0482 0.1239  0.1149 0.1599 -0.0930 0.1860* 
 (0.625) (0.094) (0.249) (0.106) (0.091)  (0.147) (0.140) (0.019) (0.105)
Economic Growth  0.0111 0.0369 0.3932
** 0.0200 0.0290  -0.1719 0.0034 0.1115 0.1860
 (0.026) (0.043) (0.187) (0.038) (0.049)  (0.068) (0.061) (0.029) (0.040)
Industrial Countries  0.3012 -0.2832 -10.785 0.8333 0.7786  5.5037 -1.4321
* 0.3776 -0.1638
 (0.388) (0.494) (9.776) (0.513) * (0.745)  (4.951) (0.931) (0.376) (0.697)
Constant -2.3670 -3.4972 -5.2325 -0.2823 2.8224  -3.255 -3.5919 -0.1067 -3.8239
 (1.663) (2.516) (4.222) (2.722) (2.544)  (3.786) (4.112) (1.600) (3.823)
Pseudo R-Squared  0.07 0.07 0.413 0.11 0.14   0.24 0.06 0.18 0.21
All are probit regressions that include sectoral dummies (nine).  17
Table 5. Post-Privatization Labor Outcomes and Foreign Control,  
Probit Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable  Coefficient of 
Foreign Control
Standard Error Statistically 
Significant? 
Rehires -0.2566  (0.104)  Yes 
Wage rehires  0.1456  (0.132)  No 
White collar rehires  0.0026  (0.909)  No 
Permanent rehires  -0.3847  (0.348)  No 
New hires  -0.4470  (0.415)  No 
Permanent new hires  0.5067  (0.479)  No 
White collar new hires  -0.4137  (0.488)  No 
Temporary hires  -0.8463  (0.222)  Yes 
Fires -0.0385  (0.199)  No 
   * Statistical significance in Column 4 refers to 5 percent or higher. 
 